Date when decision was rendered: 25.3.1982

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1234; 1995/31/81

Reference to source

KHO 1982-A-2.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1982 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1982 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1982 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1982

Pages: pp. 45-47

Subject

elections, freedom of expression, equality,
val, yttrandefrihet, jämlikhet,
vaalit, ilmaisuvapaus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 10 of the Constitution Act; sections 25, 139, 155 of the Local Government Act; Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of of Judical Procedure

= regeringsformen 10 §; kommunallagen 25 §, 139 §, 155 §; rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= hallitusmuoto 10 §; kuntalaki 25 §, 139 §, 155 §, oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §

Abstract

The town executive board of Loimaa decided that election posters for the upcoming local elections could be placed only in certain places.Each party taking part in the elections was allowed the same number of posters.The decision was based on the town police regulations with reference to public order and security, as no Act of Parliament or Decree regulated the placement of election posters.

A political party appealed to the county administrative court.According to the party, centralizing the election posters to certain places restricted the possibilities of political parties to inform the voters of their programme as well as the possibilities of the voters to form their opinion.It was thus in violation of the freedom of expression as prescribed in section 10 of the Constitution Act.The party also referred to section 10 of the Political Parties Act which requires equal treatment of all parties.As the party had the largest number of candidates, the decision of the town executive board meant that the party was allowed a smaller number of posters per candidate than other parties.Furthermore, the party claimed that X, who was the elections ombudsman for party Y, should not have participated in the decision of the town executive board as he was not impartial.

The county administrative court found that there was no reason to doubt X's impartiality under Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure or section 25-1 of the Local Government Act.It also concluded that the restrictions as to the placement of posters did not violate the freedom of expression of the party concerned.

The Supreme Administrative Court came to the same conclusion as the county administrative court as regards X's impartiality.It also found that the decision of the town executive board only prohibited the free placement of election posters and was not in contradiction with section 10 of the Constitution Act.Furthermore, the Court concluded that the decision to divide the places for posters equally between the parties participating in the elections was not a violation of the equal treatment of all parties.The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the county administrative court.

17.4.1998 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.4.1998

Judicial body: Labour Court = Arbetsdomstolen = Työtuomioistuin

Reference: Report No. 34; R63/97

Reference to source

Registry of the Labour Court

Arbetsdomstolens registratorskontor

Työtuomioistuimen kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

sexual discrimination, equality, pregnancy, equal remuneration,
könsdiskriminering, jämlikhet, graviditet, rätt till lika lön för lika arbete,
sukupuolisyrjintä, tasa-arvo, raskaus, oikeus samaan palkkaan samasta työstä,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 7 and 8 of the Equality Act; general municipal collective agreement

= jämlikhetslagen 7 §, 8 §; kommunalt allmänt tjänste- och kollektivavtal

= laki miesten ja naisten välisestä tasa-arvosta 7 §, 8 §; kunnallinen yleinen virka- ja työehtosopimus.

CEDAW-11-2-b, Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 156, Council Directive 75/117/EEC , Article 119 of the EC Treaty

Abstract

Several trade unions in the public sector asked the Labour Court to affirm that section 26 of the general municipal collective agreement (KVTES) was null and void, or null as far as it stipulated that maternity leave and parental leave were not to be regarded as time periods that shall be taken into account when calculating an employee's entitlement to a salary supplement based on work experience, to the extent that the total absence from work exceeded 30 days.

The trade unions also asked the Court to affirm this entitlement in a specific case of nurse X who had worked in the municipal sector and had been on maternity leave and parental leave.Based on section 26-2 of the collective agreement, her employer had refused to take this time into account when calculating her entitlement to a salary supplement based on work experience.The trade unions claimed that this violated sections 7 and 8 of the Equality Act, Article 119 of the EC Treaty, Council Directive 75/117/EEC on equal pay, Article 11-2-b of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ILO Convention No. 156, as well as the Act on the Employment Security of Municipal Officeholders.The Equality Act prohibits salary systems and practices that are directly or indirectly discriminatory on the basis of pregnancy, giving of birth or parenthood.Article 119 of the EC Treaty guarantees the right to equal pay.Article 4 of Council Directive 75/117/EEC requires Member States to undertake appropriate measures to ensure that, i.a., provisions of collective agreements violating the principle of equal pay are declared null and void.Article 11 of the CEDAW states that State Parties shall take appropriate measures to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances.Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 156 requires states to strive to ensure that persons who care for a family and want to participate in working life are not discriminated against.

In interpreting the Equality Act, the Labour Court referred to EC law and the case law of the European Court of Justice (i.a., the cases of Danfoos, Nimz, Bilka and Gillespie).Considering the question whether the collective agreement violated the Equality Act, the Court noted that the employer claimed that the salary supplement was based on real work experience that improves the skills and work results of an employee.Under the Equality Act, salary supplements are considered as allowed if benefitting men and women on equal conditions.The Court noted that the prohibition of discrimination in the Equality Act cannot be vaived by means of signing a collective agreement.Taking the above considerations into account, the Labour Court found that section 26-2 of the collective agreement violated the Equality Act as far as it stipulated that maternity leave and parental leave are not to be regarded as time periods taken into account when calculating an employee's entitlement to a salary supplement based on work experience, to the extent the leave exceeds 30 days.The Court the refore declared the provision void to this part and affirmed the right of the nurse in the specific case to have the whole time period of her maternity and parental leave taken into account in the calculation of her entitlement to salary supplements based on work experience.(A vote).

The judgment was the first where the Labour Court found a provision of a collective agreement to be void due to its character as being sexually discriminatory.The same collective agreement also applies to study leave and military service.As the case concerned maternity leave and parental leave, the Court took no stand on these issues.

20.4.1998 / 27.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 6.10.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2147/1998 (1341/2/97)

Reference to source

KHO 1998:53.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1998 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1998 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1998 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1999

Pages: pp. 143-160

Subject

right to property, equality, taxation,
äganderätt, jämlikhet, beskattning,
omistusoikeus, tasa-arvo, verotus,

Relevant legal provisions

Income Tax Act; sections 5 and 6 of the Constitution Act

= inkomstskattelagen; regeringsformen 5 §, 6 §

= tuloverolaki; hallitusmuoto 5 §, 6 §.

ECHPR-1-1

Abstract

Parliament had enacted a law that increased the taxation of certain forms of income based on the possibility of a company employee to benefit from the company's shares.The law had been amended so that it affected benefits received after the date the Government Bill in question had been presented to Parliament, i.e. with limited retroactive effect.The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the claim that the taxation decision affecting the applicant would violate the right to property, as guaranteed in section 6 of the Constitution Act.The Court stated that the taxation in question did not violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.Furthermore, the Court dismissed the claim that the taxation would violate the right to equal treatment, as prescribed in section 5 of the Constitution Act.

23.10.2002 / 27.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 9.4.2002

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 923; R2000/291

Reference to source

KKO 2002:28.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2002 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2002 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2002 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2002

Pages: pp. 131-134

Subject

fair trial, public hearing, equality,
rättvis rättegång, offentligt förhör, jämlikhet,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, julkinen menettely, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

section 9 2 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings; section 24 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities; section 21 of the Constitution Act

= lag om offentlighet vid rättegång 9 § 2 mom.; lag om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet 24 §; grundlagen 21 §

= laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta 9 § 2 mom.; laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta 24 §; perustuslaki 21 §.

ECHR-6-1; CCPR-14-1

Abstract

In a murder case before a court of first instance, two of the three defendants were minors.The case contained sensitive information on the private life of the persons concerned.For these reasons, the court heard the case in camera, except for the prosecutor's presentation of the charges as far as the summary penal order and the description of the acts charged were concerned.These were heard in an open hearing, but the identity of the victim was not disclosed.The court also ordered that the trial materials were to be kept secret for a period of 40 years, with the exceptions mentioned above.One of the defendants, A, appealed against this decision and asked that his/her response to the prosecutor's charges should be made public.The appeal court did not change the decision of the first instance court.

A appealed further to the Supreme Court and claimed, among other things, that he/she as a defendant had not been treated equally with the prosecutor and had not been given the possibility to defend himself/herself in public.The Supreme Court referred to the grounds for declaring trial documents secret as provided for in the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings and the Act on the Openness of Government Activities.It noted that in interpreting these secrecy provisions, a court must take into account the provisions concerning fair trial included in the Constitution Act, the ECHR and the CCPR.In restricting the publicity of court proceedings, the parties to a case must be treated on an equal basis, unless otherwise required by the interests protected by the secrecy provisions.The court noted that A's response to the charges did not contain any information about the other minor defendant nor any new and sensitive information about the victim which had not already been included in the prosecutor's presentation of the charges.As the presentation of the charges had been public, there were no grounds, according to the Supreme Court, not to make A's response public as well.The Supreme Court changed the decisions of the lower courts so that A's response was declared public, except for information concerning the identity of the victim and the annexes to the response.

9.5.2003 / 16.9.2003 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 31.12.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3444; 1584/1/03

Reference to source

KHO 2003:102.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2003 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2003 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2003 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2007

Pages: pp. 654-661

Subject

equality, legal protection, right to property,
jämlikhet, rättsskydd, äganderätt,
tasa-arvo, oikeusturva, omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

section 191-3 of the Land Use and Building Act; sections 6, 15, 21 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= markanvändnings- och bygglag 191 § 3 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 15 §, 21 § och 22 §

= maankäyttö- ja rakennuslaki 191 § 3 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 15 §, 21 § ja 22 §

Abstract

The municipal authorities had drawn up a shore plan which had been approved by the municipal council.In the shore plan the estate owned by D had been designated an area for the construction of holiday homes.The owners of the neighbouring estates appealed against the municipal council's decision to the administrative court which revoked the decision as far as the construction area designated for D's estate was concerned.The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed D's appeal on the basis of section 191-3 of the Land Use and Building Act which prescribes that only local authorities are entitled to appeal a decision of the administrative court revoking the local authority's decision to approve a land use plan or a building ordinance.If a detailed shore plan has been drawn up by a landowner, however, the landowner is entitled to appeal the decision of the administrative court.The Supreme Administrative Court decided the matter by a vote (5-4).The judges left in the minority referred to sections 6 (equality before the law as well as to various provisions in the Land Use and Building Act concerning appeal in planning issues.According to the judges, the quoted provisions show that landowners should be guaranteed equal rights and equal treatment in planning issues.They noted that the prohibition of appeal in section 191-3 was an exception to the general rules of appeal, which provide for a possibility to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against a decision of an administrative court in planning issues.The judges pointed out that when a plan is revoked with regard to a small restricted area only, it may happen that the area is completely left outside a land use plan and, for example, construction on the area is not possible in practice.When the administrative court revokes a part of a plan, it simultaneously takes a stand as to the interpretation of the Land Use and Building Act and its provisions pertaining to the matter.If the prohibition of appeal applies in these situations, the landowner cannot have the decision of the administrative court reviewed by a higher court.Therefore, the judges suggested a narrow interpretation of section 191-3: the prohibition of appeal should not apply to a landowner's appeal in cases where an administrative court has revoked a shore plan with regard to a small restricted area.Consequently, the Supreme Administrative Court should have considered D's appeal.

20.1.2005 / 3.7.2009 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 27.8.2004

Judicial body: Vaasa Administrative Court = Vasa förvaltningsdomstol = Vaasan hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 04/0253/3; 00411/04/5990

Reference to source

Registry of Vaasa Administrative Court

Vasa förvaltningsdomstols registratorskontor

Vaasan hallinto-oikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

equality, non-discrimination, sexual orientation, homosexuality, church,
jämlikhet, icke-diskriminering, sexuell orientering, homosexualitet, kyrka,
tasa-arvo, syrjintäkielto, seksuaalinen suuntautuminen, homoseksuaalisuus, kirkko,

Relevant legal provisions

section 6 of the Non-Discrimination Act; section 6 of the Constitution Act; section 1 of the Act on Registration of Partnership; Chapter 24, section 4 of the Church Act; Chapter 6, section 24-1 of the Church Order

= lag om lika behandling 6 §; grundlagen 6 §; lag om registrerat partnerskap 1 §; kyrkolagen 24 kapitel 4 §; kyrkoordning 6 kapitel 24 § 1 mom.

= yhdenvertaisuuslaki 6 §; perustuslaki 6 §; laki rekisteröidystä parisuhteesta 1 §; kirkkolaki 24 luku 4 §; kirkkojärjestys 6 luku 24 § 1 mom.

Abstract

A had applied for the position as an assistant vicar.The Cathedral Chapter decided that A was not qualified for the position because of the fact that she was living in a same-sex relationship and possibly intended to register that partnership.A appealed against the decision to the administrative court, referring among other things to the prohibition of discrimination in the Constitution Act and in international human rights treaties.The administrative court noted that the registration of a same-sex partnership is accepted and prescribed in law.It then referred to the Constitution Act and the Non-Discrimination Act and to the prohibition of discrimination, without an acceptable reason, on the ground of personal characteristics.The court regarded a same-sex partnership as a reason pertaining to a person or to personal characteristics.In the court's opinion, exceptions to the prohibition of discrimination are not possible in this case unless the reasons for disqualification, though based on the teachings of the church, are also based on the law.As there are no such exceptions included in the Church Act, A could not be disqualified on the grounds presented in the decision of the Cathedral Chapter.The matter was returned to the Cathedral Chapter for a new consideration.

20.1.2005 / 20.1.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 3.10.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2489; 1812/3/04

Reference to source

KHO 2005:62.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2005 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2005 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2005 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2009

Pages: pp. 369-380

Subject

elections, freedom of expression, right to vote, equality,
val, yttrandefrihet, rätt att rösta, jämlikhet,
vaalit, ilmaisuvapaus, äänioikeus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2 and 40 of the Locl Government Act; sections 12 and 14 of the Constitution Act

= kommunallag 2 § och 40 §; grundlagen 12 § och 14 §

= kuntalaki 2 § ja 40 §; perustuslaki 12 § ja 14 §.

ECHR-10; ECHRP-1-3; CCPR-19; CCPR-25

Abstract

A municipal executive board had given general instructions regarding the upcoming Parliamentary elections and the placing of election posters in the areas owned by the municipality.In these areas, the municipality would arrange the placing of election posters by reserving an equal amount of space for each political party.Any other placing of posters was forbidden.In order to cover the costs for these arrangements, the municipality requested from each political party participating in the elections a sum of EUR 840.Political party X appealed against the decision to the administrative court and further to the Supreme Administrative Court claiming that the decision resulted in unreasonable restrictions of the right to freedom of expression and the right to vote and to be elected.The Supreme Administrative Court held that a municipality has a right to decide in which way the areas owned by the municipality are used in campaing publicity.The decision of the executive board did not restrict the possibility to place election posters in privately owned areas.Considering the requirements of public order, public safety and a pleasant city environment, the municipality may decide that election campaign publicity is centralized as defined in the decision of the executive board.The impact on freedom of expression is not unreasonable in relation to the purpose of such arrangements.The Supreme Administrative Court also noted that a municipality had no statutory duty to arrange election campaign publicity.In view of the fact that the municipality had, on the basis of municipal self-government, voluntarily undertaken to arrange the placing of election posters, it was within its authority to require compensation for such arrangements.The payment of EUR 840 was based on the actual costs of the arrangements.The Court pointed out that there were also other means than outdoor campaigns available for political parties in distributing information about their programme and their candidates.It concluded that requesting the sum of EUR 840 as a compensation did not unreasonably restrict the right to freedom of expression and was also not in violation of the principle of equal treatment.

26.5.2006 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 18.1.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 89; 1593/3/02

Reference to source

Registry of the Supreme Administrative Court

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens registratorskontor

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

disabled persons, equality, social rights, non-discrimination,
handikappade, jämlikhet, sociala rättigheter, icke-diskriminering,
vammaiset, tasa-arvo, sosiaaliset oikeudet, syrjintäkielto,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2, 13, 65 and 90 of the Local Government Act; section 17-2 of the Social Welfare Act, sections 3 and 9-1 of the Act on services for persons with disabilities; section 17 of the Decree on services for persons with disabilities; sections 6, 19-3 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= kommunallag 2 §, 13 §, 65 § och 90 §; socialvårdslag 17 § 2 mom., lag om service och stöd på grund av handikapp 3 § och 9 § 1 mom.; förordning om service och stöd på grund av handikapp 17 §; grundlagen 6 §, 19 § 3 mom. och 22 §

= kuntalaki 2 §, 13 § 65 § ja 90 §; sosiaalihuoltolaki 17 § 2 mom.; vammaisuuden perusteella järjestettävistä palveluista ja tukitoimista annettu laki 3 § ja 9 § 1 mom.; vammaisuuden perusteella järjestettävistä palveluista ja tukitoimista annettu asetus 17 §; perustuslaki 6 §, 19 § 3 mom. ja 22 §.

Abstract

A municipal social welfare board had in its budget proposal suggested the allocation of funds for the purpose of granting certain allowances under the Act on services for persons with disabilities.The municipal executive board had decided to delete these funds from the budget proposal.The municipal council adopted the budget as proposed by the executive board.As a consequence, during that budget year no funds could be allocated under the Act on services for persons with disabilities for the reimbursement of a car needed for the transportation of a disabled person.The administrative court took note of the Constitution Act and the duty of public authorities to guarantee adequate social, health and medical services for everyone (section 19-3) and the observance of basic rights and liberties and human rights (section 22).It also referred to the Local Government Act which prescribes the duty of local authorities to perfom the functions laid down for them by law as well as their duty to compile a budget which safeguards the preconditions for performing these functions.

Under the Act on services for persons with disabilities, the local authorities have a duty to find out as to what extent services are needed.The administrative court ruled that by adopting the budget the municipal council had agreed to budgetary goals and funds which did not safeguard, as required by the Local Government Act, the preconditions for performing the functions assigned to the municipality under the Act on services for persons with disabilities.The decision of the municipal council was therefore contrary to law.The majority of the Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the administrative court.In its decision, the Court also referred to the principle of equality in section 6 of the Constitution Act.Within the framework of the funds allocated in the budget, a municipal social welfare board must be able to consider each individual need for services for the disabled and to provide services in a priority order which is in accordance with the constitutional requirement that no one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently on the ground of health, disability or other reason that concerns his or her person.

26.5.2006 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 27.11.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 3118; 794/3/99

Reference to source

KHO 2000:63.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2000 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2000 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2000 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2001

Pages: pp. 99-110

Subject

disabled persons, social rights, right to social, health and medical services, equality, non-discrimination,
handikappade, sociala rättigheter, rätt till social- hälsovårds- och sjukvårdstjänster, jämlikhet, icke-diskriminering,
vammaiset, sosiaaliset oikeudet, oikeus sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluihin, tasa-arvo, syrjintäkielto,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 1 and 3 of the Act on the Status and Rights of Patients; sections 14-1-2 and 14-3 of the Primary Health Care Act; sections 6, 19 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om patientens ställning och rättigheter 1 § och 3 §; folkhälsolagen 14 § 1 mom. 2 punkten och 14 § 3 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 19 § och 22 §

= laki potilaan asemasta ja oikeuksista 1 § ja 3 §; kansanterveyslaki 14 § 1 mom. 2 kohta ja 14 § 3 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 19 § ja 22 §.

Abstract

A municipal senior physician had decided to order to X, as part of the medical treatment provided by the municipality, one or two pairs of orthopaedic shoes per year.X had applied for three pairs of orthopaedic shoes.Because of the nature of her disability X wore out several pairs of special shoes per year.This was confirmed by various expert reports.

The county administrative court handled the case as an administrative dispute and dismissed the claim.The court held that the municipality had no specific legal obligation to provide orthopaedic appliances for everyone in need of such appliances and that the decisions on granting orthopaedic appliances are made within the framework of the budgetary means allocated for the social and health services in the municipality.

The Supreme Administrative Court did not agree with the lower court.In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court referred, among other provisions, to the Primary Health Care Act as well as to section 19 of the Constitution Act, concerning the duty of the public authorities to guarantee for everyone adequate social, health and medical services, and to section 6 of the Constitution Act, concerning equality before the law and the prohibition of discrimination.The Court ruled that the municipality had, under public law, the obligation to provide X with the necessary appliances for medical rehabilitation.In the Court's opinion, the municipality had not shown that it was unable to provide X with the orthopaedic appliances she needed, within the framework of the budgetary funds allocated for social and health services.The municipality had also failed to show that there would have been reasons, acceptable under section 6 of the Constitution Act, to give priority to other health or medical services to the effect that it was not possible to meet with X's individual needs.The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the county administrative court and ordered the municipality to provide X with orthopaedic shoes in accordance with her medically assessed needs.

31.5.2006 / 2.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 19.6.2002

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 19.06.2002/1516; 1257/3/00

Reference to source

KHO 2002:43.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2002 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2002 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2002 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: pp. 361-372

Subject

right to social, health and medical services, social rights, equality, non-discrimination,
rätt till social-, hälsovårds- och sjukvårdstjänster, sociala rättigheter, jämlikhet, icke-diskriminering,
oikeus sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluihin, sosiaaliset oikeudet, tasa-arvo, syrjintäkielto,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 1, 3 and 4 of the Act on the Status and Rights of Patients; sections 14-1-2 and 14-3 of the Primary Health Care Act; sections 6, 19 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om patientens ställning och rättigheter 1 §, 3 § och 4 §; folkhälsolagen 14 § 1 mom. 2 punkten och 14 § 3 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 19 § och 22 §

= laki potilaan asemasta ja oikeuksista 1 §, 3 § ja 4 §; kansanterveyslaki 14 § 1 mom. 2 kohta ja 14 § 3 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 19 § ja 22 §.

Abstract

A medical officer of a health centre had ordered that X, because of her injuries, should receive physical therapy as part of the medical treatment provided by the municipality.However, a decision had been made in the municipality to the effect that due to a shortage of funds physical therapy would in general not be provided for persons between the age of 18 and 64 years.X was 42 years old.Because the municipality could not provide the necessary treatment, X should have sought physical therapy at a private clinic at her own expense.

The administrative court held that the municipality had no specific legal obligation to provide physical therapy for everyone in need of such therapy.Decisions to grant medical rehabilitation are made within the framework of the budgetary funds allocated for the social and health services in the municipality.In the court's opinion, the municipal authorities had not exceeded their discretionary powers when excluding, due to a shortage of funds, persons of working age from physical therapy provided by the municipality.

In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court referred to section 19 of the Constitution Act, concerning the duty of public authorities to guarantee for everyone adequate social, health and medical services, and to the prohibition of discrimination in section 6 of the Constitution Act and section 3 of the Act on the Status and Rights of Patients.The Court found that adequate health and medical services cannot always be provided without giving priority to some services over others.However, when putting services in priority order the prohibition of discrimination must be taken into account.In addition, the municipal authorities have a duty to assess a person's state of health and his or her individual need for adequate health and medical services.A person cannot be denied adequate health and medical services which are based on his or her medically assessed needs merely on the basis of the person's age.The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the administrative court and returned the case to the municipality for reconsideration.

5.6.2006 / 5.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 11.11.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2789; 3930/1/08

Reference to source

KHO 2009:90.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2009 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2009 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2009 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 627-634

Subject

equality,
jämlikhet,
tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 72-1, 73, 171 and 172 of the Land Use and Building Act; section 6 of the Constitution Act

= markanvändnings- och bygglag 72 § 1 mom., 73 §, 171 § och 172 §; grundlagen 6 §

= maankäyttö- ja rakennuslaki 72 § 1 mom., 73 §, 171 § ja 172 §; perustuslaki 6 §

Abstract

X and Y each owned an unbuilt piece of land which had been partitioned from a larger property unit in a shore area.They had made a mutual agreement according to which one building could be constructed on each piece of land.There was no local detailed plan or legally binding local master plan which could be used as the basis for granting a building permit, so building in the area was possible only by exceptional permission granted by the regional environment centre on terms specified in the Land Use and Building Act.X applied for such a permission, in order to build a holiday home with two smaller adjacent buildings.The regional environment centre denied the application.In its decision, the environment centre referred to the agreement between X and Y and noted also that the question must be resolved by means of drawing up a local detailed plan.X appealed against the decision to the administrative court which referred the matter back to the environment centre.The environment centre in turn appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the agreement between X and Y had no legal significance when assessing whether an exceptional permission could be granted under the Land Use and Building Act.X's application could not be denied on the grounds cited by the regional environment centre.Moreover, the principle of equality, as prescribed in section 6 of the Constitution Act, requires that all land owners in the area shall be treated equally when drawing up a plan under the Land Use and Building Act, unless there are grounds pertaining to land use which would justify differential treatment.Therefore, when making a decision on the exceptional permission, the impact which the planned building on X's land may have on the possibilities to build on other pieces of land partitioned from the same original property unit or on other properties in the area, must be taken into account.The Supreme Administrative Court referred the matter back to the regional environment centre and ordered the centre to reconsider X's application in accordance with the provisions of the Land Use and Building Act.

12.2.2010 / 21.10.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 26.11.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2796; 3485/2/08

Reference to source

KHO 2009:95.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2009 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2009 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2009 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 687-708

Subject

freedom of religion, church, fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, equality,
religionsfrihet, kyrka, rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, jämlikhet,
uskonnonvapaus, kirkko, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

chapter 5, section 1, chapter 7, section 5-2, chapter 17a, section 3, chapter 19, section 2-3, chapter 23, sections 8-1, 8-2 and 9-1, chapter 24, sections 4-1 and 4-2, and chapter 25, section 5-1 of the Church Act; chapter 2, section 6-1, chapter 5, sections 1-1 and 6, chapter 6, sections 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 and chapter 18, section 1 of the Church Order; sections 6, 27, 28-1-7 and 40 of the Administrative Procedure Act; Equality Act; section 11 of the Constitution Act

= kyrkolagen 5 kapitel 1 §, 7 kapitel 5 § 2 mom., 17a kapitel 3 §, 19 kapitel 2 § 3 mom., 23 kapitel 8 § 1 mom. och 2 mom., 9 § 1 mom., 24 kapitel 4 § 1 mom. och 2 mom., 25 kapitel 5 § 1 mom.; kyrkoordning 2 kapitel 6 § 1 mom., 5 kapitel 1 § 1 mom. och 6 §, 6 kapitel 3 § 1 mom., 2 mom. och 3 mom., 18 kapitel 1 §; förvaltningslag 6 §, 27 §, 28 § 1 mom. 7 punkten och 40 §; jämlikhetslag; grundlagen 11 §

= kirkkolaki 5 luku 1 §, 7 luku 5 § 2 mom., 17a luku 3 §, 19 luku 2 § 3 mom., 23 luku 8 § 1 mom. ja 2 mom., 9 § 1 mom., 24 luku 4 § 1 mom. ja 2 mom., 25 luku 5 § 1 mom.; kirkkojärjestys 2 luku 6 § 1 mom., 5 luku 1 § 1 mom. ja 6 §, 6 luku 3 § 1 mom., 2 mom. ja 3 mom., 18 luku 1 §; hallintolaki 6 §, 27 §, 28 § 1 mom. 7 kohta ja 40 §; laki miesten ja naisten välisestä tasa-arvosta; perustuslaki 11 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The Cathedral Chapter had ordered that X is suspended from his office as a priest for three months, because X had twice neglected his duties by refusing to hold a church service in cooperation with a female priest.X appealed against the decision to the administrative court and referred to his freedom of religion and conviction.He also claimed that the bishop, who had acted as a chairman of the Cathedral Chapter, should have been disqualified, because he had expressed his views on X's case in a report submitted to the Cathedral Chapter and in a newspaper interview before the decision on disciplinary measures against X was taken.

Regarding the impartiality of the Cathedral Chapter, the administrative court found that Article 6 of the ECHR was not applicable in this case, because, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (Manuel Linde Falero v.Spain, decision of 22 June 2000), disputes relating to the fixed-term suspension from office of civil servants are outside the scope of Article 6.The disqualification of the bishop was thus assessed in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.The court found that in his report to the Cathedral Chapter, the bishop have given an account of his discussions with X and his fellow workers which had been conducted in order to find a solution to the problems in the parish caused by conflicting views on female priests.It is the duty of a bishop to oversee the work of the church and the priests and to safeguard the unity of the parish.The bishop's report to the Cathedral Chapter was thus a part of his official duties.Regarding the newspaper interview, the court found that the bishop had discussed the policy and practice of the church in general without taking a stand on X's case in particular.The court concluded that confidence in the bishop's impartiality had not been jeopardized on the grounds that he had been attending to his official duties.

Regarding the disciplinary punishment, the court held that when X was ordinated as priest, he had exercised his freedom of religion and had at the same time committed himself to following the law and order of the church.The Church Act and the Church Order do not contain any provisions which would allow church officials to leave their tasks and duties unattended because of their religious conviction or for reasons of conscience.Officiating a service is a central official task of a priest, and it is not the question of the priest exercising his or her right to practice his or her religion as guaranteed in the Constitution Act.The court continued that arranging working shifts on the basis of gender is as such disciminatory under the Equality Act.The Evangelic Lutheran Church of Finland allows female priests, so the Equality Act is applicable also when assigning duties and shifts pertaining to church services.

The court held that an employer has a right to order how a task is carried out.In the parish where X worked, shifts had previously been arranged, if necessary, so that male and female priests were not ordered to hold services together.However, this practice was abandoned after the Bishops' Conference had recommended that the priests' duties shall be assigned on an equal basis and irrespective of gender.The court found that changing the previous practice was justified, and X had no statutory right to demand the arrangement of shifts or a right to refuse to attend to his duties by referring to earlier practice.The administrative court concluded that in refusing to hold church services, X had acted contrary to his official duties and could be submitted to a disciplinary measure.The Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the administrative court and upheld its decision.

24.2.2010 / 21.10.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 21.4.2008

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 743; S2007/400

Reference to source

KKO 2008:41.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2008 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2008 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2008 I tammi-kesäkuu

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of association, equality,
föreningsfrihet, jämlikhet,
yhdistymisvapaus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 32 and 33 of the Associations Act; section 13 of the Constitution Act

= föreningslag 32 § och 33 §; grundlagen 13 §

= yhdistyslaki 32 § ja 33 §; perustuslaki 13 §

Abstract

A meeting of an association had fixed the admittance and membership fees for the year 2005.It was decided that those who reside outside the district within which the association operates, would pay a considerabley higher admittance fee.Later in the same meeting, X and Y, who lived outside the district within which the association operated, were admitted as new members.X and Y brought an action for annulment against the association, claiming that the decision on admittance fee was in conflict with the Associations Act, because it essentially violated the equality of a member.Moreover, the rules of the association did not contain any provision which would make it possible to fix the amount of the admittance fee on the basis of a member's domicile.The court of first instance dismissed the action.It ruled that the decision did not violate the equality between members, because it concerned applicants who at the time of the decision had not yet been admitted as members.Also, an association has a right to freely decide on the admittance of members and the conditions for membership.The court of appeal agreed with the lower court.

The Supreme Court noted that freedom of association, as guaranteed in the Constitution Act, gives an association the right to choose its members in accordance with the rules of the association, unless otherwise prescribed in law.However, once a person has been admitted as member, he or she has rights which the association is obliged to respect.X and Y had been admitted as members of the association and, after their admission, were therefore obliged to pay an admittance fee.The rules of the association explicitly refer to the admission fee as an obligation of a member, and a failure to fulfill this obligation could lead to expulsion from the association.The decision on admission fee thus concerned X's and Y's obligations as members of the association.In the Supreme Court's opinion, the right to bring an action for annulment was independent from the question whether X and Y were members of the association or not at the time the decision was made.The Court continued that freedom of association also means that, unless otherwise prescribed in law, an association has a right to specify in its rules the ways in which it organizes its activities.In this case, the rules of the association laid down an obligation for members to pay an admission fee when joining the association.However, it did not appear from the rules that the amount of the admittance fee could vary, depending on which group a member belongs to.The Court concluded that without a basis in the rules of the association, the decision concerning a higher admittance fee for those who reside outside the district within which the association operates, violated essentially the equality between the members and was therefore void under the Associations Act.The Supreme Court ordered the association to pay back to X and Y the admission fee to the extent it exceeded the fee charged from other new members.

31.3.2010 / 31.3.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 21.8.2008

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2019; 3699/3/07

Reference to source

KHO 2008:61.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2008 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2008 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2008 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2011

Pages: pp. 254-262

Subject

disabled persons, equality, children,
handikappade, jämlikhet, barn,
vammaiset, tasa-arvo, lapset,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 1, 9-2, 10 and 20 of the Act on services for persons with disabilities; sections 12 and 13 of the Decree on services for persons with disabilities; sections 6 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om service och stöd på grund av handikapp 1 §, 9 § 2 mom., 10 § och 20 §; förordning om service och stöd på grund av handikapp 12 § och 13 §; grundlagen 6 § och 22 §

= laki vammaisuuden perusteella järjestettävistä palveluista ja tukitoimista 1 §, 9 § 2 mom., 10 § ja 20 §; vammaisuuden perusteella järjestettävistä palveluista ja tukitoimista annettu asetus 12 § ja 13 §; perustuslaki 6 § ja 22 §

Abstract

X was a severely disabled four-year-old child, who needed constant supervision.The family lived in a house with a big yard.The parents had built a fence around the yard in order to make it easier to keep an eye on X while he was out in the yard.They applied for reimbursement of the building costs from the municipality under the Act on services for persons with disabilities.According to the Act, a municipality shall compensate any reasonable costs incurred by renovations which are made to the home of a person with severe disabilities and are necessary in order for that person to manage in his or her everyday life.Both the municipal social welfare board and, after the parents' appeal, the administrative court were of the opinion that building a fence around the yard could not be regarded as a necessary renovation under the Act.The Supreme Administrative Court, however, ruled in favour of the parents.

The Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that the Act on services for persons with disabilities (380/1987) had been enacted and came into force before the constitutional rights reform in 1995 which, among other things, extended the protection of fundamental rights to effective equality and social rights and which also took into account the rights of the child.In the Court's view, the relevant constitutional provisions must be kept in mind when applying the Act on services for persons with disabilities.The Court then continued that the Act does not specify the various types of reimbursable renovations.These are defined in section 12 of the Decree on services for persons with disabilities.However, the Act does not contain any explicit provision which would make it possible to restrict the scope of application of the Act by means of a statute of a lower level than an Act.Therefore, the Court held, the Decree on services for persons with disabilities cannot be interpreted to the effect that it would prevent the reimbursement of costs incurred by building a fence in order to create safer conditions for the outdoor exercise of a severely disabled child, when the requirements for claiming reimbursement for necessary renovations are met in accordance with the Act.Considering the nature, cause and manifestations of X's severe disability, his right to outdoor exercise in the same manner as other children of his age, and the positive effect of exercise on his development, building a fence around the yard could be regarded as necessary in order for X to manage in his everyday life and activities.Therefore, the Court concluded, the parents' application for reimbursement of the building costs on the basis of the Act on services for persons with disabilities could not be rejected.The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of the municipal board and the administrative court and returned the matter to the board for reconsideration.

15.4.2010 / 28.3.2011 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 19.3.2014

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 603; S2012/374

Reference to source

KKO 2014:14.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2014 January-June

Avgörande av Högsta domstolen 2014 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2014 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2014

Pages: 107-116

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, right to property, equality,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, äganderätt, jämlikhet,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

section 7-2 of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act; sections 6, 10, 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag angående införande av lagen om faderskap 7 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 10 §, 15 § och 106 §

= laki isyyslain voimaanpanosta 7 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 10 §, 15 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

Twin sisters A and B had been born out of wedlock in 1959.They claimed that they had known since their childhood that C was their father and had believed that the paternity had been established by means of a child maintanance agreement which C had respected.In 2009, A and B filed a paternity suit and requested a DNA test.C objected to the confirmation of paternity.According to the transitional provisions of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act, a paternity suit in relation to a child who had been born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Paternity Act (1 October 1976) had to be filed within five years from the entry into force of the Act (i.e., before 1 October 1981).Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal dismissed the claim on the grounds that the proceedings had not been initiated within the statutory time-limit.Both courts found that applying the time-limit did not in this case violate the right to private life as guaranteed in the Constitution Act and the ECHR.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts.In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed at length the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights and referred also to its own decision in a precedent case (KKO 2012:11).The court noted that the assessment whether reasons favouring the granting of the right of appeal weigh heavier than the reasons speaking against it, must be made on a case-by-case basis and with an intent to reach a fair balance between the competing interests.Considering the statutory time-limit, the court found that A and B had had a real opportunity to have the paternity confirmed by a court within the time-limit and that the failure to do so was not due to reasons beyond their control.A and B had known the identity of their father long before the time-limit was imposed.They were 17 years old when the Paternity Act came into force and they reached the age of majority in 1977, which was more than four years before the time-limit expired.It would have been possible to have the paternity confirmed through a DNA test within the time-limit, because the mother and the putative father were both alive.In the court's view, the claim that A and B were not fully aware of the legislation on the establishment of paternity cannot as such be regarded as decisive.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that a child has, save in exceptional cases, a right to know of his or her biological father and a right to at least once bring an action for judicial recognition of paternity.However, the court noted that no support can be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights for an interpretation that the child should have a right to freely choose the particular point in time when to file a paternity suit despite a statutory limitation period.The introduction of a time-limit for the institution of paternity proceedings may be justified by the desire to ensure legal certainty and finality in family relations.Therefore, the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the ECHR.

The Supreme Court continued that the confirmation of paternity, as falling within the scope of the right to private life, may be in conflict with the right to property in cases where the putative father, in relying on the statutory time-limit, has made arrangements concerning his property.Also, the child requesting the establishment of paternity may have expectations concerning inheritance.With reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court noted that the right to private and family life (Article 8) does not require the recognition of inheritance rights, except when taken together with the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).In this case, C had relied on the legal state of affairs and the statutory time-limit and had made arrangements in order to transfer the large family farm to his daughter and heir.The Supreme Court concluded that applying the time-limit did not in this case violate the private life of A and B.

A and B had also claimed that restriction of their right to institute paternity proceedings amounted to discrimination in comparison with children born after the entry into force of the Paternity Act.The Supreme Court assessed whether there was reasonable justification for such a difference in treatment.It referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as well as to its own case law and noted that the time-limit can no longer be applied in a rigid and inflexible manner.The assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis and considering, in particular, whether a child has had a real opportunity to clarify the identiy of his or her father and to have the paternity confirmed by a court.Thus construed, restriction of the time allowed to institute paternity proceedings is possible, even considering the prohibition of discrimination.The court concluded that applying the time-limit in this case did not put A and B in a different position without acceptable justification, due to their date of birth, to those children who were born out of wedlock after the entry of the force of the Paternity Act.

23.12.2015 / 1.2.2016 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 28.5.2010

Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus

Reference: Report no. 645; S08/1210

Reference to source

VaaHO:2010:3.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, equality, rights of the child,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, jämlikhet, barnets rättigheter,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, tasa-arvo, lapsen oikeudet,

Relevant legal provisions

section 7-2 of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act; sections 6-2, 10 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag angående införande av lagen om faderskap 7 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 6 § 2 mom, 10 § och 106 §

= laki isyyslain voimaanpanosta 7 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 6 § 2 mom., 10 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-8; ECHR-14; CRC-7; CRC-8

Abstract

X was born in 1970 and had been adopted in 1971.In 2005, X filed a paternity suit on the basis of the 1975 Paternity Act in order to establish that Y, who had died in 1998, was X's biological father.According to the transitional provisions of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act, a paternity suit in relation to a child who has been born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Paternity Act (1 October 1976) had to be filed within five years from the entry into force of the Act (i.e., before 1 October 1981).The court of first instance noted that the five-year time-limit was not absolute and exceptions could be made in certain cases.In addition to the Implementation Act, the court considered the case from the point of view of the relevant constitutional and human rights provisions on the prohibition of discrimination, the right of the child to know his or her parents and the right to respect for private and family life.Noting also that there had been no actual family bond or other relationship between X and Y, the court concluded that a strict application of the time-limit in this case was not unreasonable and dismissed the action.

On X's appeal, the court of appeal first noted that when the five-year time-limit expired, X had been 11 years old.According to the law in force at the time, being a minor, X's right to be heard could have been exercised by the adoptive parents, who however had no interest in bringing an action for the confirmation of Y's alleged biological paternity.Only after having attained 15 years of age, X would have had an independent right to be heard, parallel to that of the adoptive parents.The court of appeal found that there had been legal reasons which had prevented X from initiating paternity proceedings within five years from the entry into force of the Paternity Act.A strict application of the time-limit in this case would thus be in evident conflict with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR and the prohibition of discrimination in section 6 of the Constitution Act.It would put X in a worse position than children born out of wedlock after the entry into force of the Paternity Act and children born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Act who were old enough to initiate proceedings themselves in due time.In the opinion of the court, this worse position of a child under the age of 15 was not acceptable.Consequently, the court applied the provision on the time-limit to the effect that the time-limit should start at the earliest from June 1985 when X had turned 15.However, X had not initiated paternity proceedings until in 2005.Also, X had not presented any evidence to the claim that X had not known the identity of the alleged biological father until in the 2000s and that X's mental health problems had prevented any further clarification of the matter.The court of appeal concluded that it had not been shown that X would have lacked the necessary information in order to request the establishment of Y's alleged paternity or to clarify the matter within the five-year time-limit starting in 1985.The court therefore dismissed the action.The decision of the court of appeal is final.The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision no. 866 of 9 May 2012).

11.1.2016 / 11.1.2016 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 30.1.2012

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 158; S2010/118

Reference to source

KKO 2012:11.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2012 January-June

Avgörande av Högsta domstolen 2012 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2012 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2012

Pages: 74-101

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, equality,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, jämlikhet,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

section 7-2 of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act; sections 6, 10 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag angående införande av lagen om faderskap 7 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 10 § och 106 §

= laki isyyslain voimaanpanosta 7 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 10 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-8: CRC-7

Abstract

A was born out of wedlock in 1961.He had found out as late as in 2007 that B was his biological father.B agreed to a DNA test, which showed with 99.9 per cent certainty that B was A's biological father.However, B did not acknowledge his paternity.In order to confirm the paternity, A filed a paternity suit under the 1975 Paternity Act.B objected, on the grounds that the statutory time-limit for filing a paternity suit had expired.According to the transitional provisions of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act, a paternity suit in relation to a child who had been born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Paternity Act (1 October 1976) had to be filed within five years from the entry into force of the Paternity Act (i.e., before 1 October 1981).

In its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in equivalent cases concerning Finland (Backlund v.Finland and Grönmark v.Finland, judgments of 6 July 2010).The Supreme Court noted, among other things, that a strict application of restrictions of the right to institute paternity proceedins may lead to a violation of the right to respect for private life if such restrictions in practice prevent any clarification as to a person's biological father and the confirmation of the paternity.An assessment must be made whether reasons favouring the granting of the right of appeal weigh heavier than the reasons speaking against it.Knowing one's biological origin and its judicial confirmation are important parts of a person's identity and fall to the core areas of protection of private life.A child has, except in special circumstances, a right to know who his or her biological father is and to have the case concerning confirmation of paternity examined by a court at least once.In Finland, a child's legal relationship to a father can be confirmed, according to the Paternity Act, only by acknowledgement or by a court decision.Any legal effects, based on other legislation, cannot be restricted in the context of the confirmation of the paternity; if necessary, they are to be decided separately.Imposing restrictions in the current case of A was in the court's view not justified because the expressely mentioned main aim of the Paternity Act is the realisation of the legal equality of children.The constitutional principles of equality before the law and non-discrimination must also be taken into account.In the current case, because B had refused to acknowledge his paternity, A had no other alternative for the confirmation of the paternity but filing a paternity suit before a court.The Supreme Court found that A had not had a real opportunity to institute paternity proceedings within the statutory time-limit or any other alternative means of having the paternity confirmed.During the process, B had not brought forth any grounds relating to his rights or those of his family to support that A should not be granted the possibility to institute paternity proceedings.In the court's opinion, the fact that B had relied on the legal state of affairs and the statutory time-limit could not as such be regarded as sufficient grounds for denying A's right of action.The Supreme Court concluded that dismissing A's claim as time-barred would be in evident conflict with the right to respect for private life as provided for in the Constitution Act.Therefore, the time-limit should not be applied in this case.The court also held it had been shown that B was A's father.

Two concurring justices of the Supreme Court left the time-limit inapplicable, for the purpose of respecting the right to know one's biological origin and the right to private life, but held that this should not lead to producing legal effects of paternity.One dissenting justice would have dismissed the claim.He agreed that A had a right to know his biological origin but held that this request had already been fulfilled by means of the DNA test, which showed with 99.9 per cent certainty that B was A's father, and a court decision was in fact not necessary.

1.2.2016 / 1.2.2016 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 20.8.2019

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 3712; 189/3/18, 193/3/18, 195/3/18, 213/3/18, 220/3/18, 223/3/18, 235/3/18, 247/3/18 and 261/3/18

Reference to source

KHO 2019:98.

Electronic database for the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens beslut inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

effective remedy, equality, oral hearing,
effektiva rättsmedel, jämlikhet, muntligt förfarande,
tehokas oikeussuojakeino, tasa-arvo, suullinen menettely,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 3, 5, 6, 12, 13 and 38 of the Competition Act; sections 37 and 39 of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act; sections 31-1, 44 and 45-1 of the Administrative Procedure Act; sections 2-2 and 2-4, 22, 27 and 62 of the Public Transport Act; Articles 101-1 and 107-1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

= konkurrenslag 3 §, 5 §, 6 §, 12 §, 13 § och 38 §; förvaltningsprocesslag 37 § och 39 §; förvaltningslag 31 § 1 mom., 44 § och 45 § 1 mom.; kollektivtrafiklag 2 § 2 och 4 punkten, 22 §, 27 § och 62 §; Fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt artikel 101-1 och artikel 107-1

= kilpailulaki 3 §, 5 §, 6 §, 12 §, 13 § ja 38 §; hallintolainkäyttölaki 37 § ja 39 §; hallintolaki 31 § 1 mom., 44 § ja 45 § 1 mom.; joukkoliikennelaki 2 § 2 ja 4 kohta, 22 §, 27 § ja 62 §; Sopimus Euroopan unionin toiminnasta 101 artikla 1 kohta ja 107 artikla 1 kohta.

ECHR-6; Articles 41, 47, 51-1 and 52-3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Abstract

The Competition and Consumer Authority had submitted a proposal to the Market Court under which a penalty payment amounting to over EUR 30 million should be imposed on seven coach companies, the bus sector lobby group Finnish Bus and Coach Association and Matkahuolto (a service and marketing company promoting bus and coach services in Finland).In 2010-2015, the companies had sought to maintain their status in the market and to prevent the access to the market of competitors by excluding new regular services from Matkahuolto's timetable and ticket purchase services as well as parcel delivery services.The Market Court found that the companies had operated a cartel and ordered each of the parties involved in the cartel to pay a EUR 100,000 penalty payment for prohibited restriction of competition.Both the Competition Authority and the cartel companies appealed against the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.

In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court applied the Competition Act, TFEU as well as the relevant case law of the CJEU.The Supreme Administrative Court found that the anti-competitive behavior of the companies prevented the liberalization of the market and delayed opening it up to competition.The court increased the amount of the financial penalties imposed on the respondent companies to a total sum of EUR 8,9 million.Heavier fines were imposed on Matkahuolto (EUR 4,3 million) and Koiviston Auto (EUR 2,3 million) which is one of the largest bus companies in Finland.The payments imposed on the smaller bus companies and the Finnish Bus and Coach Assosiation varied between EUR 100,000 and EUR 600,000.

The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Market Court had not fully assessed the nature and extent, degree of gravity, and the duration of the infringement on an individual basis, taking into account the conduct of each of the companies involved.The amount of the penalty payment must be in proportion to the gravity of the infringement, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.The Market Court's decision did not take into account the varying sizes and turnovers of the companies involved.This was contrary to the principle of equal treatment of the respondent companies, within the meaning of the relevant anti-trust case law of the CJEU.Some of the companies had requested an oral hearing.The Supreme Administrative Court assessed the request in light of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights.The court concluded that an oral hearing was not necessary because the Market Court had held an oral hearing in the first instance.

21.2.2020 / 21.2.2020 / RHANSKI